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Social cooperation often requires collectively beneficial but individually costly 18 
restraint to maintain a public good1-4, or it needs costly generosity to create one1,5. 19 
Status quo effects6 predict that maintaining a public good is easier than providing 20 
a new one. Here we show experimentally and with simulations that even under 21 
identical incentives, low levels of cooperation (the ‘tragedy of the commons’2) are 22 
systematically more likely in Maintenance than Provision. Across three series of 23 
experiments, we find that strong and weak positive reciprocity, known to be 24 
fundamental tendencies underpinning human cooperation7-10, are substantially 25 
diminished under Maintenance compared to Provision. As we show in a fourth 26 
experiment, the opposite holds for negative reciprocity (‘punishment’). Our 27 
findings suggest that incentives to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’ need to 28 
contend with dilemma-specific reciprocity.  29 
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Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species able to collaborate for the creation 30 
of common benefit9,11-13. Collective actions such as voting, participating in political 31 
movements, the provision of the welfare state, charity, volunteering and teamwork are 32 
examples of public goods that come into existence by the generosity of many people 33 
that puts the greater good before self-interest1,5. Cooperation is, however, not always 34 
about providing collectively valuable resources, but often about maintaining existing 35 
ones1-4. Limiting CO2 emissions, sustaining natural resources, or maintaining common 36 
pastures and biodiversity are important examples of cooperation problems that require 37 
restraint in exploiting existing socially beneficial public goods.  38 
In this paper, we show experimentally and with simulations that cooperation for 39 
maintaining an initially existing public good is substantially and systematically 40 
weaker than cooperation for creating a new public good even if they are otherwise 41 
identical social dilemmas. This is unexpected, given that many people are biased 42 
towards the status quo and defaults6, which should ease cooperation when the public 43 
good already exists compared to when it needs to be provided.  44 
We show that the reason for lower cooperation in the maintenance dilemma is 45 
that reciprocity, a fundamental force behind the evolution of cooperation and human 46 
sociality7-10, is substantially diminished in maintaining compared to providing a 47 
public good. Simulations show that, despite some variability, lower cooperation in 48 
Maintenance than Provision is a systematic effect to be expected with a likelihood of 49 
70%. The simulation results also provide an explanation for the mixed findings in 50 
some related literature.14-23  51 
In our experiments, we focus sharply on the behavioural differences between 52 
initially existing and inexistent public goods (Fig. 1) and abstract from technological 53 
complexities, loss aversion, time discounting and institutional details relevant in real 54 
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world social dilemmas1,24-29. In ‘Maintenance’, a group of four people possesses a 55 
common pool of 80 tokens and each member can withdraw up to 20 tokens. 56 
Upholding the status quo by withdrawing nothing earns each group member 32 57 
money units (MU); if all withdraw maximally, everyone earns 20 MU. In ‘Provision’, 58 
the common pool is initially empty and 80 tokens are distributed equally among group 59 
members who decide simultaneously how many tokens (up to 20) to contribute to the 60 
pool. In the status quo all earn 20 MU, and all contributing maximally earns each 61 
member 32 MU.  62 
Using the setup described in Fig. 1, we run three series of experiments with 704 63 
participants who interact anonymously in three generic settings of social interaction 64 
(see Methods).  All experiments involve a between-subjects comparison of 65 
cooperation in Maintenance and Provision. We also elicit beliefs about group 66 
members’ contributions to (or withdrawals from) the public good. Participants need to 67 
successfully complete a comprehension test before the experiment starts.  68 
In the first experiment, called One-shot, participants (n = 288) take a single 69 
decision only. This experiment is a basic measure of people’s cooperativeness in the 70 
absence of strategic incentives to cooperate. In a second experiment, called Strangers, 71 
participants (n = 256) play the games of Fig. 1 for 27 iterations with randomly 72 
changing group composition in each round. This experiment is a sequence of one-shot 73 
interactions that permit learning about cooperativeness in the population30-32. The 74 
third experiment (n = 160), called Partners, keeps group composition constant across 75 
the 27 iterations, which creates strategic incentives for cooperation32,33.  76 
The effective size of the public good (after withdrawals or contributions) is 77 
smaller in Maintenance than Provision in all experiments (Fig. 2, Supplementary 78 
Table 1). In One-shot, the public good in Maintenance is on average 27% smaller than 79 
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in Provision (Fig. 2, Panel 1; 23.8 vs. 32.6; two-sided t-test, t = -2.51, P = 0.014). 80 
Low levels of the public good (less than 10% of the optimal size of 80), are more 81 
likely in Maintenance than Provision (23% vs. 0%; χ2(1) = 9.51, P = 0.002). 82 
In Strangers, the public good starts out 23% lower in Maintenance than 83 
Provision (22.7 vs. 29.5; two-sided t-test, t = -1.92, P = 0.059) and decays on average 84 
to about 5% of the socially efficient level in both problems (Fig. 2, Panel 2). Thus, the 85 
tragedy of the commons is almost maximal in both Maintenance and Provision.  86 
In Partners, the public good starts 33% smaller in Maintenance than Provision 87 
(27.7 vs. 41.3; two-sided t-test, t = -2.96, P = 0.005) and drops over time (Fig. 2, 88 
Panel 3). On average the public good is 37.3% smaller in Maintenance than Provision 89 
(10.6 vs.16.9; linear mixed effects model, P = 0.035).  90 
Comparing Partners and Strangers reveals the extent to which strategic 91 
incentives help the provision of the public good. We find that in Maintenance the 92 
average size of the public good is only 3.6 units higher in Partners than Strangers 93 
(10.6 vs. 7.0; linear mixed-effects model, P = 0.346, Supplementary Table 2), while 94 
in Provision the public good is on average twice as large in Partners than Strangers 95 
(16.9 vs. 8.2; linear mixed effects model, P = 0.004). Thus, strategic incentives to 96 
increase cooperation are substantially weaker in Maintenance than Provision.  97 
Taken together, these results show that high levels of the public good are harder 98 
to achieve in Maintenance than Provision in One-shot and in the first period of 99 
Partners and Strangers. This is surprising given that in Maintenance the public good 100 
enjoys a head start because it is already provided at the outset. Furthermore, while in 101 
Strangers the size of the public good converges to similar long-run equilibrium levels, 102 
in Partners the initial differences are persistent and lead to different long-run 103 
outcomes between Provision and Maintenance. The aim of our further analysis is to 104 
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understand the differences in cooperation outcomes by investigating whether initial 105 
resource allocation affects reciprocity in response to restraint and generosity, 106 
respectively. 107 
Studying reciprocity is particularly interesting due to its fundamental role for 108 
human sociality7-10. In our settings, reciprocity takes the form of conditional 109 
cooperation: the willingness to cooperate provided others do the same30,32,34,35. Here, 110 
we distinguish between two forms of conditional cooperation, which are inspired by 111 
the concepts of weak and strong reciprocity9,10,36. Weak reciprocity can occur in stable 112 
relationships and means behaving conditionally cooperative for self-regarding 113 
strategic reasons. By contrast, strong reciprocity entails non-selfish conditional 114 
cooperation not only in repeated interactions but also in one-shot games. Strong 115 
reciprocity is a preference for conditional cooperation, whereas weak reciprocity is a 116 
behavioural strategy deployed for self-regarding reasons.  117 
Studying reciprocity as a preference requires looking beyond cooperation 118 
outcomes and to measure attitudes to cooperation separately from outcomes. The 119 
reason why this is important is that people who differ in their ex ante attitudes can ex 120 
post make the same cooperation decision. To see why, consider that a conditional 121 
cooperator’s ex ante attitude is to cooperate only if they believe their group members 122 
do so too. But there may also be ‘free riders’, who never want to contribute to the 123 
public good irrespective of their beliefs how much others contribute. A conditional 124 
cooperator who believes that others do not contribute and a person with a free rider 125 
attitude both contribute nothing: their ex post behavior is observationally equivalent 126 
despite different ex ante attitudes. Thus, if cooperation is a function of attitudes and 127 
beliefs, the challenge is to separate them empirically. Our approach, which we call the 128 
‘ABC of cooperation’, achieves this separation. This also allows us to compare strong 129 
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reciprocity as measured by the ABC approach with reciprocity estimated from 130 
observed behaviour.  131 
The ABC approach measures individual attitudes (!"), beliefs (#"), and effective 132 
contributions ($") separately and explains cooperation as !"(#") 	→ $". It is inspired 133 
by30 and implemented as follows. All three experiments start with an incentive-134 
compatible elicitation of attitudes without feedback in a one-shot version of either the 135 
Maintenance or the Provision dilemma. The elicited attitudes are our main measure of 136 
strong reciprocity. Eliciting attitudes involves specifying a vector	!"  of contributions 137 
or withdrawals as a function of all possible average contributions or withdrawals of 138 
other group members. We classify participants as conditional cooperators (that is, 139 
strong reciprocators) if the entries in the vector !" are increasing in others’ 140 
contributions or withdrawals, or as a free rider if a participant’s !" consists of only 141 
zero contributions or maximal withdrawals. We refer to the remaining participants as 142 
‘others’. After attitude elicitation, the three experiments proceed as described above. 143 
In all experiments, we elicit incentivized beliefs (#") about other group members’ 144 
average withdrawal or contribution and we observe effective contributions ($") to the 145 
public good (see Methods).  146 
In the repeated direct interactions of Strangers and Partners we measure 147 
conditional cooperation in linear mixed-effects models by regressing individual 148 
contributions or withdrawals on the average contribution or withdrawals of other 149 
group members in the previous period (Supplementary Information). The relation 150 
between these two variables, the coefficient )*, is our measure of conditional 151 
cooperation. We will call )* ‘estimated reciprocity’.  152 
In Strangers, )* is an estimate of strong reciprocity because there are no 153 
strategic incentives to pretend being a reciprocator. Because 	)* is estimated from 154 
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behavior only, it is a proxy for strong reciprocity. But we expect that participants with 155 
attitudes that classify them as conditional cooperators will have )* > 0, whereas 156 
people with a free rider attitude will display )* ≈ 0. 157 
In Partners, conditional cooperators will also have )* > 0, which may be larger 158 
than in Strangers due to added incentives for weak reciprocity. Free riders may 159 
therefore also display )* > 0. Furthermore, we will use the attitudes !" and )* to 160 
study the link between strong and weak reciprocity.  161 
Elicited attitudes are significantly different in Maintenance and Provision  162 
(χ2(2) = 31.03, P < 0.001; Fig. 3a). In Maintenance, participants are significantly less 163 
likely to be conditional cooperators than in Provision (42% vs. 64%; χ2(1) = 31.03,  164 
P < 0.001); are significantly more likely to be free riders (28% vs. 17%; χ2(1) = 10.46, 165 
P = 0.001) and are also significantly more likely to display an unclassified attitude 166 
(‘others’; 30% vs. 19%; χ2(1) = 11.08, P = 0.001). Thus, in Maintenance 58% of 167 
participants do not reciprocate their group member’s effective contributions, which is 168 
almost the mirror image of the 64% in Provision who do reciprocate. 169 
Estimated reciprocity	)* in the repeated games is also significantly lower in 170 
Maintenance than Provision in both Strangers and Partners (Fig. 3b, panel 1; multi-171 
level mixed-effects models, P < 0.001; Supplementary Table 3). The added strategic 172 
incentives for weak reciprocity significantly increase estimated reciprocity in both 173 
Maintenance and Provision (Fig. 3b, panel 1; multilevel mixed-effects models,  174 
P < 0.001; Supplementary Table 4). 175 
Estimated reciprocity is also consistent with attitude types elicited prior to the 176 
repeated games (Supplementary Tables 5-6). Participants classified as conditional 177 
cooperators show high degrees of estimated reciprocity in Strangers and Partners, 178 
significantly above that of free riders in both Maintenance and Provision (Fig. 3b, 179 
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panels 2 and 3; multilevel mixed-effects models, P < 0.001). Conditional cooperators 180 
also display significantly higher )*	in Partners than Strangers (multilevel mixed-181 
effects models, P < 0.001). As predicted, free riders in Strangers display low 182 
estimated reciprocity but show increased )* in Partners compared to Strangers. 183 
Participants classified as ‘others’ do display a substantial )*	but do not react to 184 
strategic incentives (Fig. 3b, panel 4; multilevel mixed-effects models, P > 0.166).  185 
Our next step is to investigate whether the differences in reciprocity across 186 
Maintenance and Provision can explain the observed differences in cooperation 187 
outcomes (Fig. 2). We do this by applying our ABC framework that uses attitudes and 188 
beliefs to explain effective contributions. We calculate predicted effective 189 
contributions	[!"(#") 	→ $"∗	] and compare them with actual effective contributions $" 190 
from One-shot as well as with the effective first-period contributions in the repeated 191 
experiments (Methods). Predicted and actual effective contributions are highly 192 
significantly positively correlated in One-shot as well as in all repeated games (all 193 
Spearman’s ρ > 0.59; P < 0.001).  194 
We also calculate individual-level deviations from the predicted effective 195 
contribution, $"∗ − $". In One-shot, this measure lies within ± 2 tokens in 63% and 196 
62% of the cases in Maintenance and Provision, respectively, with no differences 197 
between treatments (χ2(1) = 0.01, P = 0.903). We obtain similar results for first-period 198 
effective contributions in Strangers (66% and 63%; χ2(1) = 0.43, P = 0.514) and 199 
Partners (74% and 64%; χ2(1) = 1.86, P = 0.172). Finally, effective contributions 200 
differ significantly between attitude types: free riders contribute significantly less than 201 
conditional cooperators and ‘others’ in all conditions (Supplementary Fig. 1).  202 
The fact that the ABC approach predicts equally well in Maintenance and 203 
Provision allows us to use the elicited attitudes and beliefs as a ‘population pool’ from 204 
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which we can sample at random to run ‘simulated experiments’ (Methods and 205 
Supplementary Information).  The advantage of simulations is that we are not 206 
restricted to a specific laboratory sample we happen to draw at a given instance (with 207 
hitherto unobservable attitudes and beliefs); we can cost effectively perform a large 208 
number of identical experiments and therefore elicit a distribution of likely 209 
cooperation ratios of Maintenance relative to Provision. This also allows us to check 210 
how systematic the results are that we observe.    211 
The results of 1000 simulated experiments (Fig. 4) show that effective 212 
cooperation levels in Maintenance are lower than in Provision in 70% of all simulated 213 
experiments. This result shows that our findings that cooperation in Maintenance is 214 
lower than in Provision are systematic.  215 
Given that our results reveal important asymmetries in positive reciprocity 216 
between Maintenance and Provision, it is interesting to study whether initial resource 217 
allocation also affects negative reciprocity, which in our setting takes the form of 218 
punishment9,36. Furthermore, punishment is an expression of moral disapproval and 219 
social norms37 that are important in many real world public goods38. If the differences 220 
in positive reciprocity in Maintenance and Provision also translate into negative 221 
reciprocity, we should observe less punishment in Maintenance than Provision and, 222 
therefore, also a reduced effectiveness of punishment to stabilize cooperation in 223 
Maintenance compared to Provision. 224 
We study punishment in a fourth experiment (‘Partners with Punishment’;  225 
n = 172), which is identical to Partners except for an added punishment stage in each 226 
period after group members have made their withdrawal or contribution decisions39. 227 
In the punishment stage, each group member can assign up to 5 punishment points to 228 
 
 
 10 
each other member, where each punishment point costs one MU and reduces the 229 
earnings of the punished group member by three MU (see Methods).  230 
The attitudes elicited prior to the experiment replicate the results from Fig. 3a 231 
(Supplementary Fig. 2). Contrary to expectations, negative reciprocity, estimated as 232 
assigned punishment in reaction to negative deviations of others from own effective 233 
contribution, is substantially and significantly higher in Maintenance than in 234 
Provision. This effect is present both overall and for each attitude type (Fig. 5a, panels 235 
1-4), and it is not driven by different frequencies of punishers (Supplementary Figure 236 
3). There are no treatment differences for positive deviations (Fig. 5a, panel 1; 237 
Supplementary Table 7). Interestingly, in contrast to estimated positive reciprocity, 238 
estimated negative reciprocity does not differ between conditional cooperators and 239 
free riders (Fig. 5a, panels 2-4; Supplementary Table 8). 240 
As expected40, punishment increases the public goods to substantially higher 241 
levels compared to Partners (Fig. 5b; linear mixed effect models; Maintenance: 43.1 242 
vs. 10.6, P < 0.001; Provision: 44.1 vs. 16.9, P < 0.001; Supplementary Tables 9-10). 243 
Remarkably, the sizes of public goods are now very similar in Maintenance and 244 
Provision (linear mixed effect models; Maintenance: 43.1, Provision: 44.1, P = 245 
0.904). Besides stronger negative reciprocity, a further reason for this result is that 246 
reactions to received punishment (in terms of change in effective contributions) are 247 
also stronger in Maintenance than Provision (Supplementary Table 11). 248 
One way to reconcile the results on positive and negative reciprocity in Partners 249 
and Partners with Punishment, respectively, is to argue that also in Partners people 250 
engage in punishment by reducing their contributions in the current period as a 251 
reaction to previous negative deviations of others from own effective contributions. If 252 
such ‘implicit’ punishment is stronger in Maintenance than Provision, it could explain 253 
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why the decay in effective contributions is stronger in Maintenance than Provision. 254 
However, this conjecture is not borne out by the data.  255 
We find that participants in Partners significantly increase their contributions in 256 
round t in response to positive deviations of others from own contributions in round  257 
t-1; the reverse holds for negative deviations. However, we find both of these 258 
reactions to be significantly more pronounced in Provision than in Maintenance 259 
(linear mixed effect models; both P < 0.018; Supplementary Table 12). This confirms 260 
once again stronger conditional cooperation in Provision compared to Maintenance in 261 
Partners. It also suggests another interpretation of the results of Partners with 262 
Punishment: because voluntary conditional cooperation is weaker in Maintenance 263 
than Provision, stronger extrinsic incentives are needed, here in the form of 264 
punishment, to stabilize cooperation in Maintenance at similar levels than in 265 
Provision.  266 
Our analysis has revealed that the important principles of human cooperation of 267 
strong and weak reciprocity7-10 are substantially diminished when cooperation 268 
requires restraint in exploiting a public good as opposed to when cooperation calls for 269 
generosity to provide a public good. Our findings are consistent with the observation 270 
that failing to contribute to a public good is judged more morally blameworthy than 271 
exploiting an existing public good.41  272 
Our results can also be explained by a model of revealed altruism42,43, according 273 
to which initial resource allocation affects perceptions of generosity of actions and 274 
hence subsequent reciprocity.  Because in Provision cooperation is the result of an act 275 
of commission (contributing), while in Maintenance cooperation is achieved by 276 
omission (not withdrawing), cooperation in Provision is perceived as more generous 277 
than in Maintenance and thus Provision triggers stronger positive reciprocity than 278 
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Maintenance. By contrast, our results suggest that negative reciprocity, as expressed 279 
by people’s costly punishment, does not follow this logic because punishment is more 280 
severe in Maintenance than Provision, likely to compensate for weaker voluntary 281 
cooperation in Maintenance. 282 
Our findings from the experiments without punishment and the simulations also 283 
help explaining the mixed evidence from previous related literature, which, with a few 284 
exceptions35,44,45, only compared cooperation outcomes, that is, the effective size of 285 
the public good after contribution or withdrawal decisions. Some of these studies find 286 
higher cooperation in so-called ‘give-some’ vs. ‘take-some’ games14-17, some find the 287 
reverse18 and some find no significant differences19-23. The simulations based on our 288 
ABC approach can explain these mixed results (Fig. 4) but they also show that on 289 
average cooperation in Maintenance is generally expected to be lower than in 290 
Provision. The finding that Maintenance and Provision are systematically different 291 
also suggests that future research should choose the game (Maintenance or Provision) 292 
that comes closest to the social dilemma of interest. 293 
Our results also have potential policy relevance.46 Recent policy proposals to 294 
foster cooperation build on the power of reciprocity in combination with economic 295 
incentives47,48. Policy makers who reckon with reciprocity should therefore consider 296 
that the extent of reciprocity that can be evoked is dilemma-specific. Moreover, a 297 
problem of incentives is that they might ‘crowd out’ strong reciprocity because 298 
incentives typically strengthen self-regarding motives to cooperate49. Our finding of 299 
higher reciprocity in Provision than Maintenance suggests that crowding out may be 300 
more problematic in provision problems than in maintenance problems, because in 301 
Maintenance more people display non-reciprocal attitudes. Future research will need 302 
to address these issues, including how reciprocity and incentives interact in non-linear 303 
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settings with thresholds, resource rivalry, discounting, and hybrid social dilemmas 304 
where provision and exploitation can take place at the same time.  305 
Methods  306 
Isomorphism of Maintenance and Provision under monetary incentives. In Maintenance, 307 
each group of 4 members is initially endowed with 80 tokens placed in a “group project”; 308 
individual members have no endowment. Material incentives are described by equation (1): 309 
                                            π i =  wi + 0.4 80 -  wj4j=1                                                       (1) 310 
where 0	 ≤ 5" ≤ 20 indicates the withdrawal of individual i from the project. 311 
In Provision, the “group project” is initially empty and each group member has an 312 
endowment of 20 tokens instead. The material incentives for each individual i are described by 313 
equation (2): 314 
                                	πi = 20 - ci + 0.4 cj4j=1                                                                 (2)  315 
where 0	 ≤ $" ≤ 20 denotes the contribution of individual i to the project. 316 
Hence, under rationality and money maximization, Maintenance and Provision are 317 
isomorphic social dilemmas. Using $7 = 20 − 57 for 9 = 1, … ,4 and substituting into eq. (2) we 318 
obtain (1). Analogously, using 57 = 20 − $7 for 9 = 1, … ,4 and substituting into (1) yields (2).  319 
 320 
Experimental design details. The experiments were approved by the Research Ethics 321 
Committee in the School of Economics at the University of Nottingham. We conducted four 322 
series of experiments using the two decision situations described above and in Fig. 1. Each 323 
experiment was composed of three parts that allow to elicit the three components of our ABC 324 
framework: an individual i’s attitude (ai) towards cooperation (i’s ‘type’), i’s beliefs (bi) about 325 
others’ contribution, and i’s contribution decision (ci). Participants knew that the experiment 326 
consisted of several parts but only received information about the relevant part upon 327 
progression of the experiment. To avoid spillover effects between different parts, information 328 
about decisions and payoffs were given only at the very end of the experiment. Experimental 329 
instructions are in the Supplementary Information.  330 
In Part 1, participants were introduced to either the Maintenance or Provision problem. 331 
Before continuing, participants answered a set of computerized control questions.  332 
In Part 2, we elicited cooperation attitudes ai using a variant of the strategy method50, 333 
which allows eliciting an individual’s willingness to cooperate as a function of the other group 334 
members’ cooperation decisions. Participants were asked to make an unconditional and a 335 
conditional cooperation decision. In the unconditional decision, participants were simply asked 336 
how much they want to withdraw from (contribute to) the common pool. In the conditional 337 
contribution participants had to fill a withdrawal (contribution) table in which they had to state 338 
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their withdrawal (contribution) decision for each possible (rounded) average withdrawal 339 
(contribution) of the other three group members. This gives us the vector !", our measure of 340 
strong reciprocity. To achieve incentive compatibility, in each group a random mechanism 341 
selected three members for which the unconditional decision was payoff-relevant and one 342 
member for whom the conditional decision for the (rounded) average unconditional withdrawal 343 
(contribution) of the three other group members was payoff-relevant.  344 
Part 3 comprised a direct-response interaction that differed in its exact design protocol 345 
across the four experiments as described in the main text (One-shot, Strangers, Partners, and 346 
Partners with Punishment). This elicits component $" of the ABC framework. 347 
In all repeated experiments (Strangers, Partners, and Partners with Punishment), 348 
participants were matched in groups of four and interacted for 27 consecutive rounds under 349 
payment rules (1) or (2). Participants were not told how many rounds the experiment would 350 
last.51 This avoids endgame effects and also seems realistic for many common resource 351 
problems, which do not have a known endpoint. In Strangers, participants were re-matched 352 
randomly in 16-participants matching groups after every round, while in Partners and Partners 353 
with Punishment group composition remained constant across all 27 rounds. At the end of each 354 
round, participants received aggregate feedback on choices and outcomes.  355 
In all rounds of the direct-response interactions, we also elicited beliefs about average 356 
effective contributions of the other three group members. Participants were paid for the 357 
accuracy of their beliefs. They earned 3 points if their belief was exactly correct, and 2 (1) 358 
points when their belief deviated by 1 (2) point(s) from the true average effective contribution. 359 
If their estimation was off by more than two points, they received no additional money. This 360 
elicits component #"	of our framework. 361 
 362 
Data collection and subject-pool socio-demographics. A total of n = 876 students 363 
participated in our experiments (Maintenance: nM = 432, Provision: nP = 444). Participants were 364 
recruited with the help of ORSEE52 from the volunteer student subject pool at the University of 365 
Nottingham. Participation was upon informed consent. The average age was 20.1 years (s.d. 366 
2.25 years); 57% were females. 59% were British, 22% Asian, 12% from other European 367 
countries and the rest from other countries. 20% were economics or business students, 18% 368 
other social sciences, 20% humanities, 14% sciences, 12% engineering, and 12% medical 369 
science, and 4% law. We conducted all experiments in the CeDEx lab at the University of 370 
Nottingham using z-Tree.53 The experiments lasted between 70 to 210 minutes depending on 371 
the experimental condition. Participants earned on average £20.60.  372 
 373 
Predicting effective contributions. In One-shot, Strangers, and Partners, the ABC approach 374 
allows us to predict contributions using elicited cooperation attitudes ai and beliefs 	375 
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#" : !"(#") 	→ $"∗	.  By matching beliefs with the corresponding decision in the contribution 376 
(withdrawal) table, we predict a contribution (withdrawal) decision $"∗ for each subject and 377 
compare $"∗  with the actual contribution $"  that we observe in the direct-response 378 
experiment.30,54  379 
 380 
Classification of attitudes. We analyse cooperation in the strategy-method experiment treating 381 
each participant’s effective contribution schedule (the vector ai) as an independent observation. 382 
We classify cooperation attitudes into three main behavioural types30: a participant is a 383 
conditional cooperator if either his/her effective contribution schedule exhibits a (weakly) 384 
monotonically increasing pattern, or if the Spearman correlation coefficient between his/her 385 
schedule and the others’ average contribution is positive and significant at the 1% level; a free 386 
rider if he/she never contributes anything (always withdraws everything) irrespective of how 387 
much others contribute (withdraw); (iii) other if neither (i) nor (ii) applies. Attitudes are a proxy 388 
for cooperation preferences because they reflect a willingness to pay for cooperation as a 389 
function of other group members’ cooperation. 390 
 391 
Simulations. For each simulated experiment, we randomly sample (with replacement) from the 392 
participant pool of Maintenance experiments attitudes and beliefs (n = 60, the median sample 393 
size in related studies also using linear public goods14-23) and calculate simulated effective 394 
contributions [!"(#7) 	→ $]. We do the same for n = 60 Provision attitudes and beliefs. This 395 
resembles an experiment where a researcher invites 60 participants per treatment and then 396 
observes their effective contribution. As a participation pool, we use all n = 876 attitudes from 397 
our four experiments (Maintenance: nM = 432, Provision: nP = 444), and n = 544 beliefs 398 
(Maintenance: nM = 268, Provision: nP = 276) from One-shot as well as the first period of 399 
Strangers. Details are in the Supplementary Information. 400 
 401 
Statistical analysis. In the One-shot direct interaction, we treat ( #", $")  as independent 402 
observations. In the repeated interactions, we treat beliefs and effective contributions at the 403 
matching group level as an independent observation. Matching groups are composed by 16 404 
participants in Strangers and by 4 participants in Partners and Partners with Punishment, 405 
respectively. For the repeated experiments, all estimations are performed using linear mixed 406 
models with random intercepts at the matching group and the individual level (see Statistical 407 
Analysis in SI for details on model specifications). 408 
 409 
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Data availability. The data for the statistical analyses are stored in Dryad Data package title: 410 
Reciprocity in Maintaining and Providing Public Goods; 411 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.8d9t2  412 
 413 
Code availability. We used STATA 14.2 for data analysis. The codes are stored in Dryad 414 
Data package title: Reciprocity in Maintaining and Providing Public Goods; 415 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.8d9t2 416 
 417 
 418 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 567 
Figure 1 | The isomorphic social dilemmas of maintaining and providing a public 568 
good. The figure illustrates initial resource allocation in Maintenance and Provision 569 
prior to decision-making. a, Maintenance: Initially, group members have 0 tokens and 570 
80 tokens are provided in the public good. Group members can simultaneously 571 
withdraw up to 20 tokens. b, Provision: Initially, each group member has 20 tokens 572 
and the public good is empty. Group members can simultaneously contribute up to 20 573 
tokens. Each token withdrawn or not contributed is worth 1 MU to the respective 574 
group member alone. Each token in the common resource is worth 0.4 MU for each 575 
group member. Material incentives therefore are to withdraw 20 tokens in 576 
Maintenance and to contribute 0 tokens in Provision, yielding 20 MU for each group 577 
member. The socially beneficial decisions of withdrawing nothing and contributing 578 
everything earn each group member 32 MU. Further details are in Methods. 579 
 580 
Figure 2 | Public good levels. Shown are the effective sizes of the public good per 581 
round after contribution or withdrawal decisions (± 1 s.e.m.). a, One-shot game, nM = 582 
140, nP  = 148. b, c, Effective public goods over the 27 rounds of interactions in 583 
randomly changing groups (Strangers, nM = 128, nP  = 128) and fixed groups 584 
(Partners, nM = 80, nP  = 80), in Maintenance and Provision, respectively. 585 
Supplementary Table 1 reports further summary statistics, including on beliefs about 586 
other group members’ average effective contributions (which mirror the effective 587 
contributions).  588 
 589 
Figure 3 | Reciprocity in Maintenance and Provision. a, Strong reciprocity as 590 
measured by cooperation attitudes; type classification as in30, nM = 348, nP  = 356. χ2-591 
tests, *** P < 0.01. Results are robust to alternative classification methods 592 
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(Supplementary Information, Section 1.2). b, Estimated reciprocity in repeated 593 
interactions (± 1 s.e.m.); Strangers (S), n = 256; Partners (P), n = 160 by treatment 594 
and attitude category (conditional cooperators, free riders, others). Positive reciprocity 595 
is estimated as the coefficient of lagged average contributions of the other group 596 
members (=>"7,?>*) from multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions (Supplementary 597 
Information, Section 1.1; Supplementary Table 3). An alternative estimation approach 598 
using finite mixture models55 confirms these results (Supplementary Table 14). 599 
 600 
Figure 4 | Simulated effective contribution ratios. Distribution of 1000 simulated 601 
effective contribution ratios between Maintenance and Provision ($@/$B) using a 602 
sample of n = 60 per treatment and simulated experiment. The sample size reflects the 603 
median sample size in related literature.14-23 The mean is 0.91, median is 0.89, and 604 
IQR = 0.76 to 1.03. Further details are in Supplementary Information, Section 1.3. As 605 
a robustness check, we ran a simulation with n = 100, which returns a mean of 0.90, a 606 
median of 0.89, and an IQR of 0.79 to 1.00 (see also Supplementary Figure 4). 607 
 608 
Figure 5 | Partners with Punishment. a, Estimated negative reciprocity (± 1 s.e.m.); 609 
by treatment and attitude category (conditional cooperators, free riders, others). We 610 
estimate negative reciprocity in multilevel mixed-effects linear regression as the 611 
number of punishment points assigned to effective contributions that deviate negatively 612 
from own contribution (Supplementary Table 7; Supplementary Information). b, 613 
Shown are the effective levels of the public goods (± 1 s.e.m.) over the 27 rounds of 614 
interactions (nM = 84, nP  = 88). 615 
 616 
 617 
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1. Supplementary Methods 
 
1.1 Supporting Statistical Analysis 
 
We analyse cooperation in the strategy method experiment treating each participant’s effective 
contribution schedule (the vector ai) as an independent observation. In the One-shot direct 
interaction, we treat each belief (𝑏𝑖) and effective contribution (𝑐𝑖) as an independent observation. 
Finally, in the repeated interactions we treat beliefs and effective contributions at the matching 
group level as independent observations. Matching groups are composed of 16 participants in 
Strangers (see Methods in main text) and of 4 participants in Partners and Partners with 
Punishment, respectively.  
 
Figure 2 Panels 2-3 – Comparisons across treatments and experiments 
To compare the size of the public good across Maintenance and Provision (Figure 2, Panels 2-
3), we run linear mixed-effects models with a random intercept at the matching group level. For 
each condition (Strangers and Partners) we estimate the following specification: 
 
𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (1) 
               
where 𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 is the size of the public good in group 𝑗 at round 𝑡; 𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑢0𝑚 is a random 
intercept at the matching group level. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a treatment dummy that takes value one for 
Provision and zero for Maintenance. We estimate this model separately for Strangers and Partners. 
To compare the size of the public good across Strangers and Partners (Figure 2, Panels 2-3) 
we estimate the following specification: 
 
𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (2) 
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where 𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 is the size of the public good in group 𝑗 at round 𝑡;  𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑢0𝑚 is a random 
intercept at the matching group level. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 is a treatment dummy that takes value one for 
Partners and zero for Strangers. We estimate this model separately for Maintenance and Provision. 
The results of the estimates from models 1 and 2 are reported in Supplementary Table 2. 
Figure 3a - Cooperation attitudes  
Following previous literature1-3, we classify cooperation attitudes into three main behavioral 
types: conditional cooperators, free riders, and others. Specifically, we classify a participant as a 
(i) conditional cooperator if either his/her effective contribution schedule (the vector ai) exhibits 
a (weakly) monotonically increasing pattern, or if the Spearman correlation coefficient between 
his/her schedule and the others’ average contribution is positive and significant at the 1% level; 
(ii) free rider if he/she never contributes anything (always withdraws everything) irrespective of 
how much the others contribute (withdraw); (iii) other if neither (i) nor (ii) applies (see Section 
2.1 for robustness checks on the classification procedure).  
 
Figure 3b – Linear mixed-effects models 
 
To obtain a measure of estimated reciprocity, we estimate the following linear mixed-effects 
model: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3) 
 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the effective contribution of individual 𝑖 in group 𝑗 at round 𝑡; 𝛽0 is a constant; 
𝑢0𝑚 and 𝑢0𝑖 are random intercepts at the matching group and individual level, respectively. 𝐶−̅𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the average contribution of the other three group members from the previous round. The variable 
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 indicates the round of the experiment and estimates a time trend. The coefficient 𝛽1 is our 
measure of estimated reciprocity that we depict in Figure 3b in the main text.  
We also estimated a model where contributions in period t are explained by beliefs about others’ 
contribution in period t. We find significantly lower reciprocity (a positive contributions-belief 
correlation) in Maintenance than Provision in Strangers; in Partners reciprocity in Maintenance is 
also lower than in Provision, but not significantly so. The problem is, however, that beliefs in 
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period t are strongly influenced by contributions of others in t-1 but the coefficients on 
contributions of others in t-1 are less than 1 in all treatments. This implies that beliefs in t are 
revised downwards beyond the observation of others’ contributions in t-1. One possible reason is 
that beliefs in t are to some extent a rationalization of planned own contributions in t, that is, beliefs 
are not fully exogenous but to some extent endogenous. We believe that this problem arises mainly 
in the repeated games, while in One-shot we interpret elicited beliefs as an exogenous component 
of the ABC framework. 
A. Smith4 proposed a solution to the endogeneity problem in repeated public goods games by 
using beliefs and effective others’ contributions in periods t-2 and t-3 as instruments for beliefs in 
period t. For the instruments to be valid, they need to be causal for beliefs but not for contributions. 
Following Smith4, p. 422, we run Sargan and Basmann χ2 tests to determine the validity of the set 
of instruments. However, the null hypothesis of valid instruments is clearly rejected in our dataset 
(all P < 0.001), making this approach infeasible. We therefore use lagged effective contributions 
of the other group members, which are less likely to cause endogeneity problems and do not suffer 
from issues of reverse causality. As a consequence, our estimates might be seen as a combination 
of the differences in reciprocal responses to others’ previous contributions and beliefs about others’ 
contributions in the current period. 
 
To compare reciprocity across Maintenance and Provision (Figure 3b, all panels), we estimate 
the following model: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 + 𝛽1?̅?−𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
   
(4) 
 
where the dummy 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 indicates the treatment. We control for different time trends across 
Maintenance and Provision. We estimate the model above separately for Strangers and Partners 
both in the full sample and for each attitude type separately. The results of the estimations from 
model 4 are reported in Supplementary Table 3. 
To compare reciprocity across Strangers and Partners (Figure 3b, all panels), we use the following 
model: 
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𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 + 𝛽1?̅?−𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
   
(5) 
 
where 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 is a dummy that takes value one in Partners and zero in Strangers. We estimate 
the model above separately for Maintenance and Provision both in the full sample and for each 
type separately. We report the results of these estimations in Supplementary Table 4. 
Finally, we compare reciprocity across attitude types in each treatment and experiment (Figure 
3b, Panels 2-4) by estimating the following model: 
𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽3𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑂𝑇
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
   
(6) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑂𝑇 are dummies that indicate whether the subject is classified in the attitude 
categories of conditional cooperators or others, respectively. We use free riders as the omitted 
category. We report results of these estimations in Supplementary Table 5. 
 
Comparing effective contributions across types (Supplementary Figure 1) 
To compare effective contributions across attitude types in One-shot (Supplementary Figure 
1a and 1b, Panel 1) we run the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model: 
𝐶𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖   (7) 
where 𝐶𝑖 is the effective contribution of participant i and 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑂𝑇 are dummies for conditional 
cooperators and others, respectively. We use free riders as the omitted category. We estimate this 
model separately for Maintenance and Provision. 
 
To compare effective contributions across attitude types in Strangers and Partners 
(Supplementary Figure 1a and 1b, Panels 2 and 3) we run the following linear mixed-effects 
model: 
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𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (8) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the effective contribution of participant i in group j at round t. 𝛽0 is a constant; 
𝑢0𝑚 and 𝑢0𝑖 are random constants at the matching group and individual level, respectively. 𝐶𝐶 and 
𝑂𝑇 are dummies for conditional cooperators and others, respectively. We use free riders as the 
omitted category. We estimate this model separately for Maintenance and Provision. The results 
from models 7 and 8 are reported in Supplementary Table 6. 
Figure 5a – Linear mixed-effects models in Partners with Punishment 
To investigate whether punishment behavior differs across Maintenance and Provision for 
given levels of positive/negative deviations between the contribution of the punisher and the 
punished person (Figure 5a, all panels), we estimate the following linear mixed-effects model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝛽1 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡, 0) + 𝛽2 max(𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡, 0) + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝛽4 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡, 0) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5 max(𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡, 0) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽8𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
 
 
(9) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is the number of punishment points assigned by individual 𝑖 in group 𝑗 to individual 𝑘 
at round 𝑡; 𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑢0𝑚 and 𝑢0𝑖 are random intercepts at the matching group and individual 
level, respectively. The coefficient 𝛽1 estimates the effect of a negative deviation of individual 𝑘’s 
contribution compared to individual 𝑖’s contribution on the number of punishment points assigned 
from individual 𝑖 to individual 𝑘. The coefficient 𝛽2 is analogous but for positive deviations. The 
coefficient 𝛽1 is our estimate of negative reciprocity, that is pro-social punishment, while 𝛽2 is an 
estimate for anti-social punishment. We depict estimates of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in Figure 5B. We also 
include the dummy 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 and we interact the dummy with the negative and positive deviation 
variables. We additionally control for the time trend including the variable 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 and for the 
average contribution of the other two group members (𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡) as well as the interaction terms 
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between these variables and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛. We estimate this model both for the entire sample and for 
each attitude type separately. We report the results from model 9 in Supplementary Table 7. 
To compare negative reciprocity across attitude types (Figure 5a, Panels 2-4), we estimate a 
model similar to 9 including interaction terms for attitude types: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 + 𝛽1 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡, 0) + 𝛽2 max(𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡, 0) + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑇
+ 𝛽5 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡, 0) × 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽6 max(𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡, 0) × 𝐶𝐶
+ 𝛽7 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡, 0) × 𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽8 max(𝑐𝑘𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡, 0) × 𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽10𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽12𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡× 𝐶𝐶
+ 𝛽14 𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡× 𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
 
 
where 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑂𝑇 are dummies that indicate whether the subject is classified in the attitude 
categories of conditional cooperators or others, respectively. We use free riders as the omitted 
category. We estimate this model separately for Maintenance and Provision. We report estimates 
of this model in Supplementary Table 8. 
 
Figure 5b – Treatment comparisons in Partners with Punishment 
To compare the size of the public good between Maintenance and Provision (Figure 5b), we 
run linear mixed-effects models with random intercepts at the matching group level. Similar to 
Partners and Strangers, we estimate the following specification: 
 
𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡   (11) 
               
where 𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 is the size of the public good in group 𝑗 at round 𝑡; 𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑢0𝑚 is a random 
intercept at the matching group level. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a treatment dummy that takes value one for 
Provision and zero for Maintenance.  
To compare the public good size between Partners with Punishment and Partners, we estimate 
the following specification: 
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𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡  (12) 
 
where 𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑡 is the size of the public good in group 𝑗 at round 𝑡;  𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑢0𝑚 is a random 
intercept at the matching group level. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a treatment dummy that 
takes value one for Partners with Punishment and zero for Partners. We estimate the model 
separately for Maintenance and Provision. The regression results from models 11 and 12 are 
reported in Supplementary Table 10. 
 
Reactions to received punishment 
As a final step in our analysis, we investigate the effectiveness of punishment by analyzing 
whether the change in contribution from round t - 1 to t is different in Maintenance and Provision 
given the same number of punishment points received in round t - 1. To compare Maintenance and 
Provision, we estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
 
 
(13) 
 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is the change in contribution of individual 𝑖 in group 𝑗 from round 𝑡 − 1 to 
round 𝑡; 𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑢0𝑚 and 𝑢0𝑖 are random intercepts at the matching group and individual 
level, respectively. The coefficient 𝛽1 estimates the impact of the number of punishment points 
received at round 𝑡 − 1 on the subsequent change in contribution at round 𝑡. We also include the 
dummy 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 and we interact the dummy with the variable 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. We 
additionally control for the time trend including the variable 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 as well as the interaction terms 
between this variable and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛. To control for differential effects of pro-social and anti-
social punishment, we run the above model separately for contributions that are below or above 
the average contribution of the group in a given round. The estimates from these models are 
reported in Supplementary Table 11.  
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Reactions to deviations of the average contribution of others from own contributions in Partners 
To investigate whether contribution behavior differs across Maintenance and Provision in 
reaction to positive/negative deviations between the average contribution of others and own 
contributions in the previous period, similar to model 9 in Partners with Punishment we estimate 
the following linear mixed-effects model: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑚 + 𝑢0𝑖 + 𝛽1 max(𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 0) + 𝛽2 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 0)
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽4 max(𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 0) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽5 max(𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 0) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
× 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽8𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
 
 
(14) 
 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the effective contribution of individual 𝑖 in group 𝑗 at round 𝑡; 𝛽0 is a constant; 
𝑢0𝑚 and 𝑢0𝑖 are random intercepts at the matching group and individual level, respectively. The 
coefficient 𝛽1 estimates the effect of a positive deviation of average effective contribution of the 
other group members compared to individual 𝑖’s contribution in round 𝑡 − 1 on 𝑖’s contribution in 
round 𝑡. The coefficient 𝛽2 is analogous but for negative deviations. We also include the dummy 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 and we interact the dummy with the positive and negative deviation variables. We 
additionally control for the time trend including the variable 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 and for the average 
contribution of individual 𝑖 in round 𝑡 − 1 (𝑐𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) as well as the interaction terms between these 
variables and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛. We report the results from model 14 in the main text and in 
Supplementary Table 12. 
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1.2 Robustness Checks 
 
Robustness checks for elicited attitudes (Figure 3a) 
To verify that our results on cooperation attitudes are robust, we perform two checks. In the 
first one, we do not classify participants but simply compare the effective average schedule (the 
vector 𝑎𝑖) between Maintenance and Provision. Recall that for each participant we have a vector 
𝑎𝑖 comprised of 21 effective contributions, one for each possible rounded average effective 
contribution of the other group members. We specify elements of the vector 𝑎𝑖 as 𝐶𝑖𝑘, where 𝑘 =
1, …, 21. We estimate the following linear mixed-effects model: 
𝐶𝑖𝑘 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐶−̅𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘  (15) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑘 is the contribution of the individual i in entry 𝑘 of the strategy method table. Our 
regressors are the average contribution of the others 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑘 in entry 𝑘, a treatment dummy 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, and the interaction term between the average contribution of others and the treatment 
dummy. We also include a constant 𝛽0 and a random intercept at the individual level 𝑢0𝑖 .  
We report the results of these estimates in Supplementary Table 13. We find a positive and 
highly significant coefficient ?̂?2, indicating that in Maintenance participants behave on average 
reciprocally, i.e., they cooperate more the higher the other group members’ effective contributions. 
We further find a positive and highly significant coefficient ?̂?3 indicating that the reaction to an 
increase in average contribution of other group members is stronger in Provision than in 
Maintenance. This confirms the result of higher reciprocity in Provision than in Maintenance. 
In our second robustness check, we use hierarchical clustering to classify participants into 
attitude types 5. Hierarchical clustering allows to partition the data into subsets, so-called clusters, 
according to measures of proximity in behavior. The advantage of this method is that it groups 
data according to their similarity without making any ex-ante assumptions on how behavior looks 
like. As a measure of proximity between any two effective contribution schedules (𝑎𝑖), we use the 
‘city block distance’ measure 5: 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 = ∑|𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘|
21
𝑘=1
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where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is an index of proximity between any two effective contribution schedules, 𝑘 indexes 
each entry in the effective contribution schedule, and 𝑥𝑖𝑘 indicates entry 𝑘 for individual 𝑖. Using 
a different proximity measure (Euclidean distance), does not affect our results. 
We then used an agglomerative method to create clusters according to our proximity measure. 
Agglomerative methods are probably the most widely used type of hierarchical methods. These 
methods start from n single-observation clusters and merge sequentially clusters until obtaining 
only one cluster with n observations. In particular, we use Ward’s linkage5 method in which the 
merger of two clusters is based on the minimization of an error term equivalent to the total within-
cluster sum of squares, that is: 
min 𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
 
where 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀 indexes the number of clusters and 
𝐸𝑚 = ∑ ∑|𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚 − ?̅?𝑘𝑚|
21
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 indexes the number of observations (in our data one observation means one 
effective contribution schedule, 𝑎𝑖); 𝑘 indexes each entry in the effective contribution schedule; 
𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑚 indicates entry 𝑘 for individual 𝑖 in cluster m; and  ?̅?𝑘𝑚 indicates the average entry 𝑘 for 
cluster m. Clearly, at the start of the routine where we have n single-observation clusters, the error 
𝐸 is equal to zero and it increases as the routine starts merging observations to form clusters. The 
objective of the method is to merge observations to minimize the increase in 𝐸. 
Finally, we used a formal method to assess the optimal number of clusters to partition our 
dataset. In particular, we use the Duda and Hart Je(2)/Je(1) and pseudo T-squared indexes, that 
indicate six clusters as optimal number in our dataset. 
To label the six categories we plot the average effective contribution schedule (𝑎𝑖) for each type 
classified according to the cluster analysis (the figure is available upon request). From visual 
observation of the average schedule, we label the six groups created in the cluster analysis as strong 
conditional cooperators, weak conditional cooperators, selfish, altruists, midrange, and triangle 
contributors. Strong conditional cooperators start out with a contribution of 0.3 when the effective 
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contribution of others is equal to zero and increase their contribution to 18.3 when other group 
members’ effective contribution is equal to twenty. Weak conditional cooperators start similarly 
with a contribution of 0.1 on average and increase to 12.7 when the other group members are fully 
cooperative. Subjects categorized as selfish contribute very low amounts for the entire average 
effective contribution schedule with a maximum of 0.25. Altruists are at the other end of the 
spectrum contributing very high amounts with a minimum of 18.7. Midrange exhibit a slightly 
decreasing contributing pattern with average effective contributions of 14.6 when the other group 
members contribute on average zero tokens and 10.5 when the others contribute on average twenty 
tokens. Finally, triangle contributors are hump-shaped with a contribution of 1.2 when the others 
contribute zero, a maximum at 7.6 when the others contribute ten tokens, and a contribution of 2.6 
when the others are fully cooperative. 
The distribution of attitude types classified in the cluster analysis is significantly different 
across Maintenance and Provision (χ2(5) = 35.31, P < 0.001). We find significantly less strong and 
weak conditional cooperators in Maintenance than Provision (32% vs. 39%; χ2(1) = 3.93, P = 
0.048, and 7% vs. 20%; χ2(1) = 18.36, P < 0.001, respectively). We also find significantly more 
selfish (30% vs. 22%; χ2(1) = 5.01, P = 0.025) and midrange (13% vs. 7%; χ2(1) = 11.23, P = 
0.001) in Maintenance than Provision. We find weak and no significant differences for altruists 
and triangle contributors, respectively (5% vs. 2%; χ2(1) = 2.95, P = 0.086; and 12% vs. 11%; 
χ2(1) = 0.34, P = 0.560). Overall, these results confirms weaker conditional cooperation in 
Maintenance compared to Provision. 
Interestingly, if we compare the distribution of attitudes from our original classification with 
the one obtained from the cluster analysis, we find that 100% of participants classified as free 
riders according to the former criterion are classified as selfish in the latter. Furthermore, 92% of 
participants classified as conditional cooperators in the former are classified as either strong or 
weak conditional cooperators in the latter. Participants classified as others are mostly classified as 
triangle contributors or midrange (38% triangle contributors, 32% midrange, 14% selfish, 13% 
altruists, 2% strong conditional cooperators, and 1% weak conditional cooperators,). Overall, this 
shows high consistency with the classification method used in the main text. 
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Robustness checks for estimated reciprocity (Figure 3b) 
To check the robustness of the results of different reciprocity between Maintenance and 
Provision in Strangers and Partners, we estimate finite mixture models. Following6, we assume 
three types: conditional cooperators (CC) whose effective contribution depends on the average 
effective contribution of the other group members in the previous round, strategic free riders 
(STR) who contribute at the beginning but reduce their contributions over time no matter what the 
other group members do and free riders (FR) who contribute zero for all rounds.  
We estimate two-limit Tobit models with limits at 0 and 20. The latent variable is the effective 
contribution of individual i in round t, 𝐶𝑖𝑡∗ . For each type, it depends linearly on a set of variables: 
CC:        𝐶𝑖𝑡∗ =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶−̅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
STR:     𝐶𝑖𝑡∗ =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
Effective contributions of conditional cooperators depend positively on the average effective 
contribution of the other group members in the previous round and negatively on a time trend (we 
expect 𝛽1 > 0 and 𝛽2 < 0). Strategic free-riders start with high effective contributions in the first 
rounds but then lower their effective contributions over time to exploit the other group members 
(𝛾1 < 0). Hence, their behavior depends only on the time trend and not on others’ effective 
contributions. 
The relationship between the latent variable and the observed effective contribution for CC and 
STR is as follows: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = {
0         𝑖𝑓                    𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗       𝑖𝑓         0 < 𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ < 20
20      𝑖𝑓                    𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0
 
 
For free riders (FR): 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0    ∀𝑡 
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To take into account censoring, the maximum likelihood function is the combination of three 
estimation regimes, depending on the value of 𝐶𝑖𝑡: 
 
Regime 1 (𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0): 
𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶) = Φ (−
𝛽0 +  𝛽1?̅?−𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝜎1
) 
𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑖 = 𝑆𝑇𝑅) = Φ (−
𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝜎2
) 
𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑖 = 𝐹𝑅) = 1 
Regime 2 (0 < 𝐶𝑖𝑡 < 20): 
𝑓(𝐶𝑖𝑡|𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶) =
1
𝜎1
ϕ (
𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽0 +  𝛽1?̅?−𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝜎1
) 
𝑓(𝐶𝑖𝑡|𝑖 = 𝑆𝑇𝑅) =
1
𝜎1
ϕ (
𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝜎2
) 
𝑓(𝐶𝑖𝑡|𝑖 = 𝐹𝑅) = 0 
Regime 3 (𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20): 
𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20|𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶) = 1 − Φ (
20 − 𝛽0 +  𝛽1?̅?−𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝜎1
) 
𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20|𝑖 = 𝑆𝑇𝑅) = 1 − Φ (
20 − 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝜎2
) 
𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20|𝑖 = 𝐹𝑅) = 0 
 
For subject i, the likelihood function is: 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝑝𝐶𝐶 ∏ 𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝐶𝐶)
𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡=0𝑇𝑡=1 𝑓(𝐶𝑖𝑡|𝐶𝐶)
𝐼0<𝐶𝑖𝑡<20𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20|𝐶𝐶)
𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡=20      + 
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𝑝𝑆𝑇𝑅 ∏ 𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑆𝑇𝑅)
𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡=0𝑇𝑡=1 𝑓(𝐶𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑇𝑅)
𝐼0<𝐶𝑖𝑡<20𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20|𝑆𝑇𝑅)
𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡=20       +   
𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∏ 𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝐹𝑅)
𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡=0𝑇𝑡=1 𝑓(𝐶𝑖𝑡|𝐹𝑅)
𝐼0<𝐶𝑖𝑡<20𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 20|𝐹𝑅)
𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡=20 
where 𝐼(. ) is an indicator function, taking value 1 if the subscript is true and 0 otherwise.  
In Supplementary Table 14 we report the maximum likelihood estimations and the resulting 
estimated mixing proportions of types separately for Strangers and Partners. In both cases, the 
distribution of types deduced from posterior probabilities is significantly different between 
Provision and Maintenance (χ2 (2) = 22.05, P < 0.001 and χ2(2) = 16.78, P < 0.001 in Strangers 
and Partners, respectively). In particular, we find significantly more conditional cooperators (45% 
vs. 18%, χ2(1) = 21.84, P < 0.001 and 55% vs. 30%, χ2(1) = 10.23, P = 0.001 in Strangers and 
Partners, respectively) and significantly less free riders in Provision than in Maintenance (22% vs. 
36%, χ2(1) = 6.16, P = 0.013 and 5% vs. 25%, χ2(1) = 12.55 and P < 0.001 in Strangers and 
Partners, respectively). In Strangers, we also find significantly less strategic free-riders in 
Provision than in Maintenance (33% vs. 46%, χ2(1) = 0.48, P = 0.029), while this is not the case 
in Partners (40% vs. 45%, χ2(1) = 0.41, P = 0.552). 
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1.3 Simulation Analysis 
Each simulated contribution is derived by matching one randomly drawn attitude and one 
randomly drawn belief from our sample. Each simulated contribution ?̃?𝐹is therefore given by: 
                                                   ?̃?𝐹 = 𝑎𝑖𝐹(𝑏𝑗𝐹)                                                  (16) 
where the superscript F indicates the sample (P for Provision and M for Maintenance) from which 
each component is randomly drawn.  
Our procedure comprises the following steps which are also summarized in the diagram below: 
a. Fix a sample size n (observations per game). 
b. Set F = P for 𝑎𝑖 𝐹 and 𝑏𝑗𝐹, and randomly draw (with replacement) one 𝑎𝑖 𝑃 and one 𝑏𝑗𝑃 from 
the Provision distribution of attitudes and beliefs, respectively. Use equation (16) to 
calculate ?̃?𝑃. Repeat this step until we have n simulated contributions. 
c. Redo step b. setting F = M for all components, i.e., 𝑎𝑖 𝑀 and 𝑏𝑗𝑀. Use equation (16) to 
calculate ?̃?𝑀. Repeat this step until we have n simulated contributions. 
d. Compare the two samples of size n derived from b. (Provision) and c. (Maintenance) by 
calculating the ratio of average effective contributions between Maintenance and Provision. 
e. Repeat steps b. - d. 1000 times. 
 
Figure 4 in the main text reports simulation results of 1000 random samples of size n = 60, the 
median sample size in previous related literature (see refs. 14-23 in the main text). As a robustness 
check, we also ran a simulation with a sample size of n = 100.The results from this simulation are 
shown in Supplementary Figure 4. 
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1.4 Experimental Instructions 
 
Here, we document the experimental instructions we used in the experiments. We document the 
exact texts used in Provision and show the changed texts used in Maintenance in [italics]. 
 
Part 1 – Introduction to Provision [Maintenance] 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study in which you will earn some money. The amount will depend on the 
outcome of a game you will play. The amount of money which you earned with your decisions will be paid 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We will not speak of Pounds during the experiment, but rather 
of points. At the end, the total number of points you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the 
following rate: 
    1 point = £0.2 
These instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to communicate during 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A member of the experimental team 
will come to you and answer them in private.  
All participants will be divided into groups of four members. Only the experimenters will know who is 
in which group. 
The decision situation 
We first introduce you to the basic decision situation. Then, you will complete a pre-study questionnaire 
on the screen in front of you, which is intended to help you understand the decision situation.  
In each group, every member has to decide the allocation of 20 tokens. You can put these 20 tokens into 
your private account or you can put some or all of them into a project. [In each group, there are 80 tokens 
in a project. You can withdraw up to 20 tokens from the project and put them into your private account or 
you can leave them fully or partially in the project.] The other three members of your group have to make 
the same decision. 
Your income from the private account 
You will earn 1 point for each token you put into your private account. For example, if you put all 20 
tokens into your private account, your income from your private account would be 20 points. If you put 6 
tokens into your private account, your income from this account would be 6 points. No one except you 
earns anything from tokens you put in your private account.  
 
Your income from the project 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you or any other group member put into 
[leave in] the project. The income for each group member from the project will be determined as follows: 
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If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project [tokens withdrawn from the project] by you and 
your other group members is 60 [20] tokens, then you and each other member of your group would earn 60 
[80-20] × 0.4 = 24 points out of the project. If the four members of the group contribute [withdraw] a total 
of 10 [70] tokens to [from] the project, you and the other members of your group would each earn 10 [80-
70] × 0.4 = 4 points. 
Total income 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and from the project: 
 
 
 
 
 
Comprehension test 
 
Please answer all the following questions, to help you understand the determination of your income. 
 
1. Each group member has 20 tokens. Assume that none of the four group members (including you) 
contributes anything to the project. [There are 80 tokens in the project. Assume that everyone in your group 
withdraws 20 tokens from the project.] 
a) What will your total income (in points) be? 
b) What will the total income (in points) of each of the other group members be? 
 
2. Each group member has 20 tokens. You contribute 20 tokens in the project. Each of the other three 
members of the group also contributes 20 tokens to the project. [There are 80 tokens in the project. You 
withdraw 0 tokens from the project. Each of the other three members of the group also withdraws 0 tokens 
from the project.] 
a) What will your total income (in points) be? 
b) What will the total income (in points) of each of the other group members be? 
 
3. Each group member has 20 tokens. The other three members contribute a total of 30 tokens to the project. 
[There are 80 tokens in the project. The other three members withdraw 30 tokens from the project.] 
Income from the project = 0.4 × (sum of contributions) [0.4 × (80 - sum of all tokens withdrawn 
from the project)] 
 
Your Total Income =   Income from your private account + Income from the project  
   =20 – your contribution to the project + 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project  
[= Tokens withdrawn from the project by you + 0.4 × (80-sum of all tokens withdrawn from the 
project) 
] 
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a) What will your total income (in points) be, if - in addition to the 30 tokens contributed by others - you 
contribute 0 tokens to the project? [What will your total income (in points) be, if - in addition to the 30 
tokens withdrawn by others - you withdraw 20 tokens from the project?] 
b) What will your total income (in points) be, if - in addition to the 30 tokens contributed by others - you 
contribute 8 tokens to the project? [What will your total income (in points) be, if - in addition to the 30 
tokens withdrawn by others - you withdraw 12 tokens from the project?] 
c) What will your total income (in points) be, if - in addition to the 30 tokens contributed by others - you 
contribute 15 tokens to the project? [What will your total income (in points) be, if - in addition to the 30 
tokens withdrawn by others - you withdraw 5 tokens from the project?] 
 
4. Each group member has 20 tokens. Assume you invest 8 tokens to the project. [There are 80 tokens in 
the project. Assume you withdraw 12 tokens from the project.] 
a) What will your total income (in points) be, if the other group members - in addition to your 8 tokens - 
contribute another 7 tokens to the project? [What will your total income (in points)? be, if the other group 
members - in addition to your 12 tokens - withdraw another 53 tokens from the project.] 
b) What will your total income (in points) be, if the other group members - in addition to your 8 tokens - 
contribute another 12 tokens to the project? [What will your total income (in points) be, if the other group 
members - in addition to your 12 tokens - withdraw another 48 tokens from the project?] 
c) What will your total income (in points) be, if the other group members - in addition to your 8 tokens - 
contribute another 22 tokens to the project? [What will your total income (in points) be, if the other group 
members - in addition to your 12 tokens - withdraw another 38 tokens from the project?] 
 
Part 2 – Strategy method experiment (elicitation of attitudes) 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment is based on the decision situation just described to you, conducted once. You will enter 
your decisions in the screen in front of you.  
As you know, you will have 20 tokens at your disposal. You can put them into a private account or into a 
project. [As you know, there are 80 tokens in a project. You can withdraw tokens from the project which 
will be automatically placed into your private account or you can leave them in the project.] Each subject 
has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we will refer to below as the “unconditional 
contribution [withdrawal]” and the “contribution [withdrawal] table”.  
x In the unconditional contribution [withdrawal] you simply decide how many of the 20 [80] 
tokens you want to put in [withdraw from] the project. Please indicate your contribution 
[withdrawal] in the following screen (screenshot taken from the Provision treatment only):  
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After you have determined your unconditional contribution [withdrawal], please click “OK”.  
x Your second task is to fill in a “contribution [withdrawal] table” where you indicate how many 
tokens you want to contribute [withdraw] to [from] the project for each possible average 
contribution [withdrawal] of the other group members (rounded to the next integer). Here, you 
can condition your contribution [withdrawal] on that of the other group members. This will be 
immediately clear to you if you take a look at the following table. 
 
This table will be presented to you in the experiment (screenshot taken from the Provision treatment 
only): 
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The numbers to the left of the blue cells are the possible (rounded) average contributions [withdrawals] of 
the other group members to the project. You have to insert how many tokens you want to contribute to 
[withdraw from] the project into each input box – conditional on the indicated average contribution 
[withdrawal] by the other members of your group. You must enter a number between 0 and 20 inclusive 
in each input box. For example, you have to indicate how much you contribute to [withdraw from] the 
project if the others contribute [withdraw] 0 tokens on average to [from] the project; how much you 
contribute [withdraw] if the others contribute [withdraw] 1, 2, or 3 tokens on average; etc. Once you have 
made an entry in each input box, click “OK”.  
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution [withdrawal] and have 
filled in their contribution [withdrawal] table, a random mechanism will select one member from every 
group. For this group member, it is his contribution [withdrawal] table that will determine his actual 
contribution [withdrawal]; whereas, for the other three group members, it is their unconditional 
contributions [withdrawals] that will determine their actual contributions [withdrawals]. You will not 
know whom the random mechanism will select when you make your unconditional contribution 
[withdrawal] and fill in your contribution [withdrawal] table. You must therefore think carefully about both 
decisions because either could determine your actual contribution [withdrawal]. Two examples should 
make this clear.  
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that the random mechanism selects you; and that the other three group members 
made unconditional contributions [withdrawals] of 0, 2, and 4 [20, 18, and 16] tokens, respectively. The 
average contribution [withdrawal] of these three group members is, therefore, 2 [18] tokens. If you 
indicated in your contribution [withdrawal] table that you will contribute [withdraw] 1 [19] token[s] if the 
others contribute [withdraw] 2 [18] tokens on average, then the total contribution to the project is given by 
0+2+4+1=7 [the total number of tokens left in the project is given by 80-(20+18+16+19)=7] tokens. Each 
group member would, therefore, earn 0.4×7=2.8 points from the project plus their respective income from 
their own private account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution [withdrawal] table that you would 
contribute [withdraw] 19 tokens [1 token] if the others contribute [withdraw] 2 [18] tokens on average, then 
the total contribution of the group to the project would be given by 0+2+4+19=25 [the total number of 
tokens left in the project would be given by 80-(20+18+16+1)=25] tokens. Each group member would earn 
0.4×25=10 points from the project plus their respective income from their own private account.  
EXAMPLE 2: Suppose that the random mechanism does not select you; and that your unconditional 
[withdrawal] contribution is 16 [4] tokens, while those of the other two group members not selected by the 
random mechanism are 18 [2] and 20 [0] tokens, respectively. Your average unconditional contribution 
[withdrawal] and that of these two other group members is, therefore, 18 [2] tokens. If the group member 
whom the random mechanism did select indicates in her contribution [withdrawal] table that she will 
contribute [withdraw] 1 [19] token[s] if the other three group members contribute [withdraw] on average 
18 [2] tokens, then the total contribution of the group to the project is given by 16+18+20+1=55 [the total 
number of tokens left in the project is given by 80-(4+2+0+19)=55] tokens. Each group member will 
therefore earn 0.4×55=22 points from the project plus their respective income from their own private 
account. If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in her contribution [withdrawal] table 
that she contributes [withdraws] 19 [1] if the others contribute [withdraw] on average 18 [2] tokens, then 
the total contribution of the group to the project is 16+18+20+19=73 [the total number of tokens left in the 
project is 80-(4+2+0+1)=73] tokens. Each group member would therefore earn 0.4×73=29.2 points from 
the project plus their respective income from their own private account.  
The random selection of the group member whose contribution [withdrawal] table will determine his 
actual contribution [withdrawal] will be made as follows. Each group member is assigned a Group 
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Member ID between 1 and 4, which denote his/her number inside his group. Moreover, one participant 
was randomly selected at the very beginning of the experiment. This participant will draw a ball from an 
urn after all participants have made their unconditional contribution [withdrawal] and have filled out their 
contribution [withdrawal] table. Each ball in the urn has a different colour and each colour corresponds to 
a Group Member ID: orange=1, blue=2, yellow=3, green=4. The resulting number will be entered into the 
computer. If the randomly selected participant draws the Group Member ID that was assigned to you, then 
your contribution [withdrawal] table will determine your contribution [withdrawal] and their unconditional 
contributions [withdrawals] will determine the contribution [withdrawals] of the other group members. 
Otherwise, your unconditional [withdrawal] contribution determines your contribution [withdrawal]. 
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Part 3 – Direct-response experiments 
1) One-shot 
 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a second experiment. The money you earn in this experiment will be added to 
what you earned in the first one. As before, we will not speak of Pounds during the experiment, but rather 
of points. At the end, the number of points you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following 
rate: 
1 point=£0.2 
As in the previous experiment you are in a group composed by 4 people. However, the composition of the 
group is entirely new. None of the participants who were in your group in the second experiment will be in 
your group in this experiment. 
The decision situation is the same as the one described on the first instruction sheet of the previous 
experiment. Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 tokens. [In each group there 
are 80 tokens in a project.] You can put these 20 tokens into your private account or you can put them fully 
or partially into a project. [You can withdraw up to 20 tokens from the project or you can leave them fully 
or partially in the project.] Each token you do not put into the project [withdraw from the project] is 
automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as before. 
Reminder: 
 
 
 
 
The decision screen looks like this (screenshot taken from the Provision treatment only): 
Your Total Income = Income from your private account + Income from the project  
     =20 – your contribution to the project + 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project  
[=Tokens withdrawn from the project by you +0.4 × (80-sum of all tokens withdrawn from the 
project)] 
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1. First you have to decide on your contribution to [withdrawal from] the project, that is, you have 
to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to the project, and how many tokens 
you want to put into your private account. [you have to decide how many of the 80 tokens you want 
to withdraw from the project and put into your private account.] Each other member of your group 
has to make the corresponding decision.  This is the only contribution [withdrawal] decision that 
you or they make in this experiment.  There is no contribution [withdrawal] table.  
 
2. Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to [withdrawal from] the project (rounded 
to an integer) of the other three group members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:  
x If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual 
average contribution [withdrawal] of the other group members), you will get 3 points in 
addition to your other income from the experiment.  
x If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points.  
x A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point.  
x If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any 
additional points.  
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2) Strangers 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a second experiment. The money you earn in this experiment will be added to 
what you earned in the first one. As before, we will not speak of Pounds during the experiment, but rather 
of points. At the end, the number of points you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following 
rate: 
1 point=£0.2 
This experiment lasts several rounds, in which you and the other group members have to make decisions. 
You will not know how many rounds the experiment will last and will be told when the experiment is 
finished. As in the previous experiment, every group consists of 4 people. The formation of the group 
changes at random after every round. So your group will typically consist of different people every 
round.  
The decision situation is the same as the one described on the first instruction sheet of the previous 
experiment. Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 tokens. [In each group there 
are 80 tokens in a project.] You can put these 20 tokens into your private account or you can put them fully 
or partially into a project. [You can withdraw up to 20 tokens from the project or you can leave them fully 
or partially in the project.] Each token you do not put into the project [withdraw from the project] is 
automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as before. 
Reminder: 
 
 
 
 
The decision screen looks like this (screenshot taken from the Provision treatment only): 
Your Total Income = Income from your private account + Income from the project  
     =20 – your contribution to the project + 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project  
[=Tokens withdrawn from the project by you +0.4 × (80-sum of all tokens withdrawn from the 
project)] 
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1. First you have to decide on your contribution to [withdrawal from] the project, that is, you have 
to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to the project, and how many tokens 
you want to put into your private account. [you have to decide how many of the 80 tokens you want 
to withdraw from the project and put into your private account.] Each other member of your group 
has to make the corresponding decision.  This is the only contribution [withdrawal] decision that 
you or they make in this experiment.  There is no contribution [withdrawal] table.  
 
2. Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to [withdrawal from] the project (rounded 
to an integer) of the other three group members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:  
x If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual 
average contribution [withdrawal] of the other group members), you will get 3 points in 
addition to your other income from the experiment.  
x If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points.  
x A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point.  
x If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any 
additional points.  
 
3. You will receive information about the outcome at the end of each round. 
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3) Partners  
 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a second experiment. The money you earn in this experiment will be added to 
what you earned in the first one. As before, we will not speak of Pounds during the experiment, but rather 
of points. At the end, the number of points you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following 
rate: 
1 point=£0.2 
This experiment lasts several rounds, in which you and the other group members have to make decisions. 
You will not know how many rounds the experiment will last and will be told when the experiment is 
finished. 
As in the previous experiment, every group consists of 4 people. However, the composition of the group is 
entirely new. None of the participants who were in your group in the first experiment will be in your group 
in this experiment. You and the other three group members will remain in this same group throughout 
the entire experiment. So your group will consist of the same people every round.  
The decision situation is the same as the one described on the first instruction sheet of the previous 
experiment. Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 tokens. [In each group there 
are 80 tokens in a project.] You can put these 20 tokens into your private account or you can put them fully 
or partially into a project. [You can withdraw up to 20 tokens from the project or you can leave them fully 
or partially in the project.] Each token you do not put into the project [withdraw from the project] is 
automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as before. 
Reminder: 
 
 
 
 
The decision screen looks like this (screenshot taken from the Provision treatment only): 
Your Total Income = Income from your private account + Income from the project  
     =20 – your contribution to the project + 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project  
[=Tokens withdrawn from the project by you +0.4 × (80-sum of all tokens withdrawn from the 
project)] 
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1. First you have to decide on your contribution to [withdrawal from] the project, that is, you have 
to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to the project, and how many tokens 
you want to put into your private account. [you have to decide how many of the 80 tokens you want 
to withdraw from the project and put into your private account.] Each other member of your group 
has to make the corresponding decision.  This is the only contribution [withdrawal] decision that 
you or they make in this experiment.  There is no contribution [withdrawal] table.  
 
2. Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to [withdrawal from] the project (rounded 
to an integer) of the other three group members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:  
x If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual 
average contribution [withdrawal] of the other group members), you will get 3 points in 
addition to your other income from the experiment.  
x If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points.  
x A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point.  
x If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any 
additional points.  
 
3. You will receive information about the outcome at the end of each round. 
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4) Partners with Punishment 
 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a second experiment. The money you earn in this experiment will be added to 
what you earned in the first one. As before, we will not speak of Pounds during the experiment, but rather 
of points. At the end, the number of points you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following 
rate: 
1 point=£0.02 
This experiment lasts several rounds, in which you and the other group members have to make decisions. 
You will not know how many rounds the experiment will last and will be told when the experiment is 
finished. 
 As in the previous experiment, every group consists of 4 people. You and the other three group members 
will remain in this same group throughout the entire experiment. So your group will consist of the 
same people every round.  
The decision situation is the same as the one described on the first instruction sheet of the previous 
experiment. Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 tokens. [In each group there 
are 80 tokens in a project.] You can put these 20 tokens into your private account or you can put them fully 
or partially into a project. [You can withdraw up to 20 tokens from the project or you can leave them fully 
or partially in the project.] Each token you do not put into the project [withdraw from the project] is 
automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as before. 
Reminder: 
 
 [] 
 
 
 
The Experiment 
Each round consists of two stages. In the first stage you will be endowed with tokens and have to decide 
how many tokens you would like to contribute to a project. [In the first stage a project is endowed with 
tokens and you have to decide how many tokens you would like to withdraw from the project.] In the second 
stage you will be informed about the contributions [withdrawals] of the other three group members. You 
will then decide whether or how much to reduce their earnings from the first stage by distributing points to 
them. 
 
STAGE 1 
The decision screen looks like this (screenshot taken from the Provision treatment only): 
 
Your Total Income = Income from your private account + Income from the project  
     = 20 – your contribution to the project + 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project  
[=Tokens withdrawn from the project by you +0.4 × (80-sum of all tokens withdrawn from 
the project)] 
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2. First you have to decide on your contribution to [withdrawal from] the project, that is, you have to 
decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to the project, and how many tokens you 
want to put into your private account. [you have to decide how many of the 80 tokens you want to 
withdraw from the project and put into your private account.] Each other member of your group has to 
make the same decision.   
3. Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to [withdrawal from] the project (rounded to 
an integer) of the other three group members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:  
x If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual 
average contribution [withdrawal] of the other group members), you will get 3 points in 
addition to your other income from the experiment.  
x If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points.  
x A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point.  
x If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any 
additional points.  
 
 
After that the first stage is over and the second stage begins. 
 
 
STAGE 2 
In the second stage you will learn your income from the first stage and you will see how much each group 
member contributed to [withdrew from] the project. Moreover, in this stage you can decide whether to 
decrease the income of each other group member by assigning deduction points. The other group members 
can also decrease your income if they wish to. This is apparent from the input screen of the second stage 
displayed below: 
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Your income and your contribution [withdrawal] from the first stage are displayed in the first two 
rows. The contributions [withdrawal] of the other group members are shown in the three columns below. 
Note that the order in which others’ contributions [withdrawals] are displayed will be determined at random 
in every round. The contribution [withdrawal] in the first column, for example, could represent a different 
group member in different rounds. The same holds true for the second and third column.  
You will have to decide how many deduction points to assign to each of the other three group members. 
You must enter a number for each of them. If you do not wish to change the income of a specific group 
member then you must enter 0. You can assign up to 5 points to each group member. 
 
You will incur costs from assigning deduction points. Every deduction point you assign costs you 1 point. 
For example, suppose you assign 2 deduction points to one member, this costs you 2 points; if, in addition, 
you assign 4 deduction points to another member this costs you an additional 4 points. Suppose further that 
you assign 0 deduction points to the third member. In total you will have assigned 6 points and your total 
costs therefore amount to 6 points. 
 
If you assign 0 deduction points to a particular group member (i.e., enter “0”), you will not alter his or her 
income. However, if you assign one deduction point to a group member you will decrease the income of 
this group member by 3 points. If you assign a group member 2 deduction points you will decrease the 
group member’s income by 6 points, and so on. Each deduction point that you assign to another group 
member will reduce his or her income by 3 points. Similarly, each deduction point assigned to you by 
another group member will reduce your first stage income by three points: 
 
Costs of received deduction points = 3 × Sum of received deduction points 
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How much the income at the second stage is decreased depends on the sum of deduction points received. 
For instance, if somebody receives a total of 3 deduction points (from all other group members), his or her 
income would be decreased by 9 points. If somebody receives a total of 4 deduction points, his or her 
income is reduced by 12 points. 
  
There is one exception to this rule. If the cost of received deduction points exceeds the group member’s 
first stage income, his or her first stage income will be reduced to zero. However, even in this case the 
group member must still incur the costs of any deduction points he or she assigned. 
 
 
For each round, your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that your income in points at the end of the second stage can be negative if the costs of your 
assigned points exceed your income from the first stage minus the income reduction by the received 
deduction points. You can, however, avoid such losses with certainty through your own decisions! 
 
After all participants have made their decision, the results from the round including your final income from 
that round will be displayed. After you have viewed the income screen the round is over and the next round 
begins. 
  
EITHER 
Your income from the first stage is greater than or equal to the cost of received deduction 
points: 
 
Total income = Income from the first stage – 3 × (sum of received deduction points) – 
 – sum of deduction points you have assigned 
 
OR 
 
Your income from the first stage is less than the cost of received deduction points: 
 
Total income = 0 – sum of deduction points you have assigned 
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3. Supplementary Tables  
Supplementary Table 1 (support for Figure 2, all panels) 
Panel A: Public Good Size 
 One-shot Strangers Partners 
 M P  M P  M P  
Round 1 23.83 
(16.00) 
32.65 
(13.81) 
P = 0.014 22.69 
(13.48) 
29.53 
(14.93) 
P = 0.059 27.70 
(14.07) 
41.30 
(14.94) 
P = 0.005 
Round 1-9    10.39 
(9.61) 
15.63 
(10.73) 
P = 0.053 14.83 
(14.85) 
23.69 
(12.58) 
P = 0.008 
Round 10-18    5.65 
(9.06) 
5.21 
(6.49) 
P = 0.831 8.18 
(13.17) 
12.63 
(12.38) 
P = 0.177 
Round 19-27    4.88 
(8.31) 
3.77 
(6.02) 
P = 0.541 8.69 
(14.57) 
14.31 
(16.79) 
P = 0.177 
All rounds 23.83 
(16.00) 
32.65 
(13.81) 
P = 0.014 6.97 
(8.99) 
8.20 
(7.75) 
P = 0.503 10.56 
(14.20) 
16.87 
(13.91) 
P = 0.035 
Panel B: Beliefs 
 One-shot Strangers Partners 
 M P  M P  M P  
Round 1 7.76 
(5.82) 
9.62 
(5.32) 
P = 0.005 6.70 
(5.92) 
8.71 
(5.77) 
P = 0.006 7.03 
(6.28) 
11.06 
(5.91) 
P < 0.001 
Round 1-9    3.17 
(3.13) 
5.66 
(4.07) 
P = 0.002 4.13 
(4.51) 
7.49 
(4.32) 
P < 0.001 
Round 10-18    1.04 
(2.05) 
1.72 
(2.02) 
P = 0.232 1.98 
(3.36) 
3.61 
(3.65) 
P = 0.059 
Round 19-27    0.82 
(1.83) 
1.02 
(1.82) 
P = 0.632 1.94 
(3.46) 
3.81 
(4.56) 
P = 0.079 
All rounds 7.76 
(5.82) 
9.62 
(5.32) 
P = 0.005 1.68 
(2.34) 
2.80 
(2.64) 
P = 0.030  2.68 
(3.78) 
4.97 
(4.18) 
P = 0.004 
Supplementary Table 1 | Descriptive statistics and tests on the size of the public good (Panel A) and on beliefs (Panel B). 
Panel A: shown is the average (std. dev.) size of the public good in all conditions. Standard deviations are calculated using 
differences across groups within a period, averaged across periods. Panel B: shown are the participants’ average (std. dev.) beliefs 
about the average effective contributions of the other group members. Standard deviations are calculated using differences across 
individuals within a period, averaged across periods. M = Maintenance, P = Provision. P values are based on two-sided t-tests for 
One-shot and the first round of Strangers and Partners. All the remaining P values are from linear mixed-effects models with random 
intercepts at the matching group level. Further details are in the Supplementary Analysis. 
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Supplementary Table 2 (support for Figure 2, Panels 2-3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Maintenance vs. Provision Strangers vs. Partners 
                (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                Strangers Partners Maintenance Provision 
Provision 1.230 6.309**   
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (1.837) (2.987)   
     
Partners           3.591 8.670*** 
 1 if Partners, 0 otherwise                  (3.781) (2.999) 
     
Constant        6.973*** 10.56*** 6.973** 8.204*** 
                (1.299) (2.112) (3.188) (2.528) 
N               432 1080 756 756 
Supplementary Table 2 | Comparing public good size between Maintenance and Provision, and 
between Strangers and Partners. Shown are estimated fixed effects from linear mixed-effects models 
(details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 - Equations 1-2). Dependent variable: public good size. 
Random intercepts are included for matching groups. Models (1) and (2) compare the public good size 
between Maintenance and Provision separately for Strangers and Partners. Models (3) and (4) compare the 
public good size between Strangers and Partners separately for Maintenance and Provision. Standard errors 
in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 3 (support for Figure 3b, all panels) 
Panel A: Strangers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All CC FR OT 
Provision -0.019 0.302 -0.706** -0.197 
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (0.383) (0.539) (0.283) (1.079) 
     
𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.172*** 0.254*** 0.038* 0.222*** 
 (0.020) (0.033) (0.021) (0.046) 
     
Provision × 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.257*** 0.228*** 0.190*** 0.238*** 
 (0.028) (0.043) (0.033) (0.073) 
     
Round -0.044*** -0.069*** -0.003 -0.056*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) 
     
Provision × Round  -0.022** -0.017 0.045*** -0.093*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.026) 
     
Constant 1.920*** 2.191*** 0.138 3.589*** 
 (0.265) (0.398) (0.178) (0.676) 
N 6656 3172 1898 1586 
Panel B: Partners 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All CC FR OT 
Provision -0.407 0.171 -0.623 -1.576 
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (0.549) (0.636) (1.212) (1.498) 
     
𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.420
*** 0.621*** 0.292*** 0.202*** 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.048) (0.075) 
     
Provision × 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.217
*** 0.096* -0.002 0.339*** 
 (0.039) (0.052) (0.090) (0.097) 
     
Round -0.027** -0.001 -0.024 -0.103*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) 
     
Provision × Round  0.024 -0.023 0.069* 0.122*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.040) (0.040) 
     
Constant 1.741*** 1.188** 0.919 3.804*** 
 (0.381) (0.479) (0.608) (1.052) 
N 4160 2366 884 910 
Supplementary Table 3 | Comparing estimated reciprocity between Maintenance and Provision.  Shown are estimated 
fixed effects from linear mixed-effects models (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 - Equation 4). Panel A 
reports estimates for Strangers, Panel B for Partners. Dependent variable: effective contributions. 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is the average 
effective contribution of the other three group members from the previous round. Random intercepts are included for 
matching groups and individuals. Model (1) is estimated using the entire sample. Models (2-4) use only the subset of 
participants classified as conditional cooperators (CC), free riders (FR), and others (OT), respectively. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
38 
 
Supplementary Table 4 (support for Figure 3b, all panels) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All 
Maintenance 
All  
Provision 
CC 
Maintenance 
CC  
Provision 
FR 
Maintenance 
FR  
Provision 
OT 
Maintenance 
OT  
Provision 
Partners -0.131 -0.557 -0.938 -1.120** 0.780 0.931 0.221 -1.165 
1 if Partners, 0 otherwise (0.514) (0.427) (0.700) (0.487) (0.487) (1.214) (1.326) (1.192) 
         
𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.170
*** 0.430*** 0.252*** 0.484*** 0.040 0.235*** 0.222*** 0.460*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.035) (0.032) (0.026) (0.044) (0.052) (0.060) 
         
Partners × 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.237
*** 0.206*** 0.348*** 0.233*** 0.254*** 0.062 -0.022 0.081 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.051) (0.041) (0.039) (0.077) (0.086) (0.079) 
         
Round -0.044*** -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.086*** -0.003 0.043*** -0.056*** -0.149*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) 
         
Partners × Round 0.016 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.061*** -0.020 0.004 -0.047 0.168*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
         
Constant 1.925*** 1.896*** 2.195*** 2.483*** 0.126 -0.725 3.588*** 3.391*** 
 (0.338) (0.266) (0.479) (0.328) (0.339) (0.742) (0.751) (0.774) 
N 5408 5408 2288 3250 1742 1040 1378 1118 
Supplementary Table 4 | Comparing estimated reciprocity between Strangers and Partners.  Shown are estimated fixed effects from linear mixed-effects 
models (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 - Equation 5). Dependent variable: effective contributions. 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is the average effective 
contribution of the other three group members from the previous round. Random intercepts are included for matching groups and individuals. Models (1-2) are 
estimated using the entire sample. Models (3-4), (5-6), and (7-8) use only the subset of  participants classified as conditional cooperators (CC), free riders (FR), 
and others (OT), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.  *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 5 (support for Figure 3b, Panels 2-4) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Strangers 
Maintenance 
Strangers 
Provision 
Partners 
Maintenance 
Partners 
Provision 
CC 2.076*** 3.003*** 0.231 1.077 
1 if CC, 0 otherwise (0.679) (0.466) (0.744) (1.392) 
     
OT 3.450*** 3.924*** 2.955*** 1.969 
1 if OT, 0 otherwise (0.739) (0.592) (0.897) (1.568) 
     
𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.040 0.228*** 0.285*** 0.300*** 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.050) (0.084) 
     
CC × 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.208*** 0.258*** 0.320*** 0.419*** 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.066) (0.089) 
     
OT × 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.181*** 0.232*** -0.087 0.239** 
 (0.046) (0.065) (0.082) (0.100) 
     
Round -0.003 0.042*** -0.025 0.048 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.038) 
     
CC × Round -0.066*** -0.127*** 0.022 -0.072* 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.041) 
     
OT × Round -0.053*** -0.191*** -0.079** -0.029 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.032) (0.046) 
     
Constant 0.139 -0.533 0.997 0.274 
 (0.508) (0.386) (0.606) (1.298) 
N 5512 5616 2080 2080 
Supplementary Table 5 | Comparing estimated reciprocity across attitude types.  Shown are estimated fixed 
effects from linear mixed-effects models (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 - Equation 6). 
Dependent variable: effective contributions. 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is the average effective contribution of the other three group 
members from the previous round. CC is a dummy for conditional cooperators and OT is a dummy for others. Free 
riders (FR) are the omitted category. Random intercepts are included for matching groups and individuals. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 6 (support for Supplementary Figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 One-shot 
Maintenance 
One-shot 
Provision 
Strangers 
Maintenance 
Strangers 
Provision 
Partners 
Maintenance 
Partners 
Provision 
CC 7.521*** 8.318*** 1.611** 1.872*** 1.503*** 1.923* 
1 if CC, 0 otherwise (1.396) (1.437) (0.634) (0.345) (0.584) (1.088) 
       
OT 6.464*** 6.105*** 3.159*** 1.817*** 1.846*** 2.630** 
1 if OT, 0 otherwise (1.435) (1.785) (0.691) (0.427) (0.702) (1.218) 
       
Constant 0.379 1.455 0.226 0.643* 1.535** 2.353** 
 (1.146) (1.302) (0.509) (0.346) (0.686) (1.052) 
N 140 148 3456 3456 2160 2160 
Supplementary Table 6 | Comparing effective contributions across attitude types. Models (1-2) report estimates from ordinary least 
squares (OLS) models. Models (3-6) report fixed effects estimates from linear mixed-effects models with random intercepts for matching 
groups and individuals (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 – Equations 7-8). Dependent variable: effective contributions. 
CC is a dummy for conditional cooperators and OT is a dummy for others. Free riders (FR) are the omitted category. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 7 (support for Figure 5a, all panels)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All CC FR OT 
Provision 0.076 -0.030 0.229** 0.214 
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (0.066) (0.078) (0.106) (0.144) 
     
Positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 -0.006** -0.006 -0.006 -0.009** 
max{ck - ci, 0} (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Provision × positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.117*** 
max{ci – ck, 0} (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
     
Provision × negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 -0.045*** -0.034*** -0.022** -0.084*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) 
     
Round -0.005*** -0.003** -0.009*** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Provision  × Round 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘,𝑗𝑡 0.007*** -0.003 0.006 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
     
Provision × 𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘,𝑗𝑡 -0.006** 0.004 -0.018*** -0.011* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.109** 0.109* 0.177*** -0.013 
 (0.047) (0.061) (0.061) (0.098) 
N 13932 6318 3645 3969 
Supplementary Table 7 | Comparing negative reciprocity across Maintenance and Provision.  Shown are estimated 
fixed effects from linear mixed-effects models (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 – Equation 9). 
Dependent variable: assigned punishment points. Model (1) compares assigned punishment points from individual i to 
individual k across Maintenance and Provision in reaction to a negative or positive deviation of k’s contribution from i’s 
contribution. 𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘,𝑗𝑡 is the average contribution of the other two members of the group (excluding i and k). Models (2-
4) are the same as Model (1) but separately estimated for conditional cooperators (CC), free riders (FR), and others 
(OT), respectively. Random intercepts are included for matching groups and individuals. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 8 (support for Figure 5a, Panel 2-4) 
  
 (1) (2) 
 Maintenance Provision 
CC -0.056 -0.382*** 
1 if CC, 0 otherwise (0.106) (0.096) 
OT -0.166 -0.237** 
1 if OT, 0 otherwise (0.109) (0.108) 
Positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 -0.006 0.005 
max(ck - ci, 0) (0.004) (0.005) 
Positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 × CC 0.000 -0.012* 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 × OT -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 0.111*** 0.089*** 
max(ci – ck, 0) (0.005) (0.006) 
Negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 × CC 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 × OT 0.006 -0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Round -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Round × CC 0.005** 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Round × OT 0.006** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡  0.006 -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡  × CC -0.009 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
𝐶−̅𝑖−𝑘𝑗𝑡  × OT 0.014** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.171** 0.458*** 
 (0.077) (0.087) 
N 6804 7128 
Supplementary Table 8 | Comparing negative reciprocity across attitude types.  Shown are estimated fixed effects 
from linear mixed-effects models (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 – Equation 10). Dependent 
variable: assigned punishment points. CC is a dummy for conditional cooperators and OT is a dummy for others. FR is 
the omitted category. Model (1) compares assigned punishment points from individual i to individual k across attitudes 
types in Maintenance. Model (2) reports the same estimates for Provision. Random intercepts are included for matching 
groups and individuals. Standard errors in parentheses.  *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 9 (support for Figure 5b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Partners with Punishment – 
Size of the public good 
 M P  
Round 1 42.43 
(13.96) 
37.05 
(13.38) 
P = 0.204 
Round 1-9 39.17 
(23.41) 
41.39 
(21.99) 
P = 0.730 
Round 10-18 42.28 
(26.70) 
43.81 
(29.93) 
P = 0.854 
Round 19-27 48.00 
(29.22) 
46.95 
(30.73) 
P = 0.905 
All rounds 43.15 
(26.44) 
44.05 
(27.55) 
P = 0.904 
Supplementary Table 9 | Descriptive statistics on public good size in Partners with 
Punishment. Average (Std. Dev.) public good size in Partners with Punishment.  Standard 
deviations are calculated using differences across groups within a period, averaged across 
periods. M = Maintenance, P = Provision. P values are based on two-sided t-test in Round 1. 
All remaining P values are from linear mixed-effects models with random intercepts at the 
matching group level.   
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Supplementary Table 10 (support for Figure 5b) 
 
  
 Maintenance vs. Provision 
Partners vs. 
Partners with Punishment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Maintenance Provision 
Provision 0.902   
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (7.501)   
    
Partners with Punishment  32.59*** 27.18*** 
1 if Partners with Punishment, 0 otherwise  (5.826) (5.898) 
    
Constant 43.15*** 10.56** 16.87*** 
 (5.365) (4.169) (4.269) 
N 1161 1107 1134 
Supplementary Table 10 | Comparing the public good size in Partners with Punishment.  Shown are 
estimated fixed effects from linear mixed-effects models (details on the estimation can be found in section 
1.1 – Equations 11-12). Dependent variable: size of the public good. Random intercepts are included for 
matching groups. Model (1) compares the public good size between Maintenance and Provision. Models (2-
3) compare the public good size between Partners and Partners with Punishment separately for Maintenance 
and Provision.  Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 11  
 
 
  
 (1) (2) 
 Below average 
contribution 
Above average 
contribution 
Received # punishment points 1.235*** 0.257*** 
 (0.065) (0.092) 
   
Provision 1.454** 0.675*** 
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (0.617) (0.261) 
   
Provision × received # punishment points -0.612*** -0.088 
 (0.101) (0.136) 
   
Round 0.019 0.077*** 
 (0.019) (0.009) 
   
Provision × Round -0.011 -0.039*** 
 (0.027) (0.013) 
   
Constant -0.418 -1.795*** 
 (0.454) (0.184) 
N 1210 3262 
Supplementary Table 11 | Comparing reaction to received punishment across Maintenance and 
Provision. Shown are estimated fixed effects from linear mixed-effects models (details on the estimation 
can be found in section 1.1 – Equation 13). Dependent variable: change in contributions from round t-1 to 
round t. Model (1) estimates the model for all cases where the contribution of individual i in round t-1 is 
below the average contribution of the other three group members. Model (2) estimates the same model for 
the cases in which the contribution of individual i in round t-1 is above the average contribution of the other 
three group members. Random intercepts are included for matching groups and individuals. Standard errors 
in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) 
Positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 in t-1 0.172*** 
max(𝑐−̅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1, 0) (0.04) 
  
Negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 in t-1 -0.554*** 
max(𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑐−̅𝑖,𝑡−1, 0) (0.05) 
  
Positive deviation from 𝑐𝑖 in t-1 × Provision 0.126** 
 (0.05) 
  
Negative deviation from 𝑐𝑖 in t-1 ×  Provision -0.154** 
 (0.06) 
  
Lagged own contribution 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 0.814*** 
 (0.04) 
  
Round -0.005 
 (0.01) 
  
Lagged own contribution 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 ×  Provision 0.048 
 (0.05) 
  
Round × Provision 0.010 
 (0.02) 
  
Provision 0.116 
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (0.43) 
  
Constant 0.913*** 
 (0.29) 
N 4160 
Supplementary Table 12 | Comparing reactions to positive and negative deviations from 
own contributions in Partners.  Shown are estimated fixed effects from linear mixed-effects 
models (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.1 – Equation 14). Dependent variable: 
effective contributions. Model (1) shows the reaction of contributions of individual i to positive 
and negative deviations from others’ average contributions in the previous period, 𝑐−̅𝑖,𝑡−1. 
Random intercepts are included for matching groups and individuals. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 13 (Robustness check for Figure 3a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) 
Avg. contribution others 0.333*** 
 (0.008) 
  
Provision -1.796*** 
1 if Provision, 0 otherwise (0.403) 
  
Avg. contribution others × Provision 0.176*** 
 (0.011) 
  
Constant        3.057*** 
                (0.286) 
N               14784 
Supplementary Table 13 | Comparing cooperation attitudes between 
Maintenance and Provision.  Shown are estimated fixed effects from a linear 
mixed-effects model (details on the estimation can be found in section 1.2 - 
Equation 15). Dependent variable: effective contribution in the contribution 
schedule 𝐶𝑖𝑘. Random intercepts are included for each individual. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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Supplementary Table 14 (Robustness check for Figure 3b) 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Strangers  
Maintenance 
Strangers  
Provision 
Partners  
Maintenance 
Partners  
Provision 
CC     
𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 0.334** 0.659*** 0.897*** 0.974*** 
 (0.142) (0.051) (0.071) (0.039) 
     
Round -0.051 -0.204*** -0.045 -0.052*** 
 (0.056) (0.022) (0.038) (0.019) 
     
Constant 5.409*** 3.093*** 0.911 0.318 
 (1.099) (0.427) (0.815) (0.397) 
STR     
Round -0.651*** -0.993*** -0.911*** -0.664*** 
 (0.063) (0.155) (0.155) (0.146) 
     
Constant -1.027 -3.118* -4.015** -3.888* 
 (0.779) (1.778) (2.034) (2.294) 
Estimated mixing proportions     
CC 0.184*** 0.456*** 0.300*** 0.549*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.057) (0.057) 
     
STR 0.460*** 0.327*** 0.451*** 0.401*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.061) (0.056) 
     
FR 0.356*** 0.217*** 0.249*** 0.050** 
 (0.043) (0.037) (0.048) (0.024) 
N 3328 3328 2080 2080 
Log L -3109.1 -4270.3 -2624.6 -3892.7 
AIC 6236.2 8558.7 5267.1 7803.4 
Supplementary Table 14 | Maximum likelihood estimation of two-limit Tobit finite mixture models. Details 
on the estimation procedure can be found in section 1.2. Dependent variable: effective contributions. 𝐶−̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is 
the average contribution of the other three group members from the previous round. CC = conditional 
cooperators, STR = strategic free riders, and FR = free riders. The bottom part of the table shows the estimated 
mixing proportions. Estimates for FR are deduced from the sum of proportions of CC and STR, the standard 
error for FR is obtained from the covariance matrix of the estimates of CC and STR. AIC is the Akaike’s 
information criterion. Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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4. Supplementary Figures 
Supplementary Figure 1 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1 | Effective average contributions by attitude type and type of strategic interaction. A, 
Maintenance. B, Provision. CC: Conditional Cooperators, FR: Free Riders, OT: Others.   
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Supplementary Figure 2 
 
Supplementary Figure 2 | Replication of results on strong reciprocity in Partners with Punishment. 
Strong reciprocity as measured by cooperation attitudes elicited prior to the repeated experiment; nM = 
84, nP  = 88. χ2-tests, *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, ns (not significant) P > 0.10.  
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Supplementary Figure 3 
 
Supplementary Figure 3 | Distribution of the number of periods in which a participant punished a 
group member in Partners with Punishment. The figure is constructed counting for each individual in 
how many out of the 27 periods they punish some other group member. The mean (median) number of 
rounds where participants punish is 7.9 (6) and 7.1 (6) in Maintenance and Provision, respectively, with 
no differences across treatments (Kolmogorov Smirnov test, P = 0.870). 
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Supplementary Figure 4 
 
Supplementary Figure 4 | Simulated effective contribution ratios. Distribution of 1000 simulated effective 
contribution ratios between Maintenance and Provision (𝑐̅𝑀/𝑐̅𝑃) using a sample of n = 100 per treatment and simulated 
experiment.  
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